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The concern of this paper is with the work of one of the great-
est American jurists of the twentieth century: Karl Nickerson Llew-
ellyn (1893-1962). The quite particular focus of the paper is with 
the place that Llewellyn occupies in the twentieth-century move-
ment in American jurisprudence that is known 部 legalrealism. 11 
Llewellyn is not only a jurist who is closely associated with the 
American legal realist movement. He is also recognized to be the 
most notable representative of the movement， and to be the jurist 
who did most to define its essential aims and objectives. That this 
is so is in large part on account of the decisive contribution that 
Llewellyn is held to have made in the 1930s to the establishing of 
the terms of the radical critique of law and adjudication， and of le-
gal processes and institutions generally， which was central to the 
realist project in American jurisprudence. 
The realist critique of legal phenomena to which Llewellyn con-
tributed in the 1930日 involvedcertain positive claims concerning 
the essentiaI nature of the law， and concerning the methods that 
were to be foIIowed for the proper understanding and explanation of 
it. These claims were sometimes left implicit rather than rendered 
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explicit， but they were for al that claims which were such as to con-
stitute a distinctively realist perspective on law and legal phenom働
ena. One important claim made by the realists was that jurispru-
dence was to be thought of as a discipline that was based in a scierト
tific method of enquiry， and hence that its subject-‘matter， the law， 
was something that was to be thought of as admitting of a fully sci-
entific analysis as to its true nature. Another important claim ad-
vanced by the realists was that the essence of law was something 
that was to be found embodied in the actual practice of the courts， 
01'， to adopt the realist idiom favoured by Llewellyn， in the actual 
behaviour of judges and other legal officials. A third claim about 
law that ran through the work of the American legal realists was 
the claim that law was to be understood and explained in instru-
mentalist terms. That is 拍 say，it was claimed by the realists that 
the law was to be understood and explained as something that func-
tioned within society as a means 01' instrument for the promotion of 
public goods and public policies， and hence as a means 01' instru岨
ment for the realization of such collectively defined ends and objec-
tives as society set and determined for itself. 
In addition to the positive claims about Iaw that the American 
legal realists advanced， the realist critique of legal phenomena of 
the 1930s also had a more negative aspect. For the realist critique 
of law was a critique that served to call into question many of what 
六 aremost appropriately to be termed orthodox assumptions about 
law， and assumptions that， as it wilI be observed， were very much 
64 、_. bound up with the viewpoint in American legal thought and prac-
tice which is known as formalism. Among the assumptions of 01'-
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thodox legal thought that the realists challenged was the assump-
tion that law and adjudication were to be conceived of as subject to 
the constraints and discipline of logic and reason. A related as-
sumption of orthodox legal thought that was brought into question 
by the realists was the assumption that formallegal rules and prin-
ciples were to be conceived of as playing a controlling role in the 
process of adjudication， such that formal legal rules and principles 
were to be taken as serving to determine the decision of actual 
cases by the courts with an acceptable degree of stability and regu・
larity. Yet again， the emphasis placed by the realists on the instru-
mental character of law committed them to challenging a further 
orthodox assumption regarding law and adjudication. This was the 
assumption that law and adjudication involved procedures of rea-
soning and decisiOIトmakingthat were to be thought of as being， in
principle at least， indi貸erentto， and exclusive of， al considerations 
which were to do with public policy and the collective interests of 
society. 
Llewellyn played a major pa吋 inbringing the orthodox assump-
tions about law and adjudication into question in the 1930s through 
his seminal contribution to the realist critique of legal phenomena 
of the period. However， itis remarkable that Llewellyn was at the 
end of his life to provide what mu抗 betaken to stand as a highly 
orthodox endorsement of law and its inherent rationality， and of the 
integrity of adjudication as a procedure involving the reasoned and 
disciplined application of law within society for the purpose of the 
resolution of disputes. The endorsement that Llewellyn gave to the 
orthodox view of law and adjudication came in his last ful同length
ムノ、
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book: The Common Law Trαdition: Deciding Appeα18 (1960). 121 This 
work is of the first importance in understanding Llewellyn in his re-
lation to the American legal realist movement. For the positions 
that Llewellyn took regarding law and adjudication in The Common 
Law Trαdition are indicative of a substantial retreat on his part 
from the radicalism of the realist project in jurisprudence as he had 
defined and argued for it in the 1930s. At the same time， the book 
points to an underlying acceptance by Llewellyn of much of the 
standpoint of legal orthodoxy， as well as pointing， ina more par幽
ticular sense， tohis a茄rmationof the inherent stability and regu-
larity of the established common law procedures of adjudication. 
In Part 1 of this paper， there is provided a summary outline ac-
count of the realist project in jurisprudence. Included here is dis-
cussion not only of Llewellyn's part in setting the tenns of the real-
ist project in the 1930s， but also discussion of other jurists who 
were associated with the legal realist movement. In Part 2 of the 
paper， there is a detailed examination of Llewellyn's arguments in 
The Common Lαw Tr，αdition. The emphasis here is on Llewellyn's 
statement and explanation of what he termed the steadying factors 
in common law adjudication， as he claimed to find them present in 
the adjudicative practice of the U ni加dStates courts at the appel-
late level. The steadying factors in common law adjudication were 
the factors that Llewellyn saw as making for stability and regular-
ity， and hence also for predictability， inthe decisions of the Ameri-
can appellate courts. The discussion that Llewellyn provided of the 
steadying factors is crucial for the argument of the present paper. 
This is so because it is what Llewellyn said about the steadying ぬか
? ? ?
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tors that underlines the ful extent of his endorsement of the integ-
rity of the common law procedures of adjudication， and the ful ex-
tent of his retreat 仕'Omthe radical form of realism that he had ar-
gued for in the 1930s. In仕leConclusion to the paper， some brief 
consideration is given to the question of the significance of Llewel-
lyn and his defence of the common law tradition of adjudication in 
relation to the broader current of positivist耐utilitarianjurisprudence 
in the Anglo-American tradition with which the realist movement is 
so closely associated. 
1. American Legal Realism 
American legal realism was a movement in legal thought and 
practice that， following a long period of development that began in 
the late nineteenth century， came to establish itself as a distinct 
movement in出ejurisprudential community of the United States in 
the early 1930s.131τ'he part played by Llewellyn in establishing the 
realist movement in the early 1930s was foundational. For the 
start of the realist movement proper is generally associated with 
the publication by Llewellyn in 1930 in the ColumbiαLαω Review 
of his seminal article ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step'.141 
In the following year， the leading American jurist Roscoe Pound 
(1870-1964) published a critique of the new realist jurisprudence in 
the If，αrvαrdLαω Review，151 and， inresponse to this， Llewellyn pub-
lished in the same joumal an article in which he summarized the 
main lines of ar伊 mentthat he saw as being developed by the ju-
? ?
?
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rists who were involved with the realist movement:‘Some Realism 
about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound，.IO! 
Llewellyn was an academic lawyer who began his career as a 
ful・timeteacher of law at the Yale Law School in 1922， before go胴
ing on to teach as a law professor at the Columbia Law School from 
1925 to 1951 and at the Chicago Law School from 1951 until his 
death in 1962. In the event， the jurists associated with the realist 
movement included practising lawyers as well as those， such as 
Llewellyn， who were academic lawyers. Thus Oliver Wendell Hol-
mes (1841-1935) practised as a lawyer in Boston following his 
graduation from the Harvard Law School， taught for a year as a 
law professor at Harvard before his appointment in 1882 to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts， and eventually went on to 
serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
from 1902 to 1935. John Chipman Gray (1839-1915) held professo-
rial appointments at Harvard in addition to practising law in Bos-
ton. Jerome New Frank (1889-1957) held important positions in 
public administration during the 1930s， including the Chairmanship 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission， before his appointment 
in 1941 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit省
Of the jurists to whom we have made reference above， only 
Llewellyn and Frank rank as members of the mainstream realist 
movement that established it日elfin the early 1930s. With that 
said， however， there should be no disputing the central importance 
of Oliver Wendell Holmes in helping to create the intellectual con幽
text for discussion about law， and about the role and functions of 
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law in society，仕omwhich there emerged the agenda in legal theoη 
that was to be addressed by jurists like Llewellyn and Frank in the 
1930s and after. lndeed， Holmes is notable for his setting down 
what were to become some of the most basic themes developed by 
the mainstream legal realists in the celebrated address that he de-
livered in 1897 at the Boston University School of Law: 'The Path of 
the Law'.17I Thus Holmes here defined law as consisting in the ac-
tual decisions made by the courts， or， as he put it， as consisting in 
predictions， orprophecies， concerning what the courts would do in 
fact.18 Then， again， Holmes cast doubt on the rationality of law as a 
form of social regulation， through his insistence that it was a fallacy 
to suppose that logic was the only force that played a part in the de-
velopment of the law.19 Yet further， Holmes pointed to the instru-
mental functions of law in its relation to society， as he d必idwhen he 
lamented the f白h凶i辺lur陀.喝eof judges to recognize what he claimed to be 
the basic duty falling on them to take i泊nt旬oaccount considerations of 
social advantage in the perfo切，rmanceof their legal wo町rk.1
The view of law that Holmes adopted in 'The Path of the Law' 
was a court-centred view of law. For it was the decisions of the 
courts that Holmes saw as determining the actual law in force in 
society. A court-centred view of law was also adopted by John 
Chipman Gray in his m弓jorwork in the field of general jurispru-
dence: The Natureαnd Sources of the Lαω(1909).1111 In this work， 
Gray argued that it was necessary to recognize a clear distinction 
between the sources of law and the law itself. For Gray， statute 
law， judicial precedents and the law of custom were not to be 
thought of as law in the ful and proper sense， but rather as the 
??
? ?
KARL N. LEWEL YN， AMERICAN LE辺札服組問，1，AND THE STEADYING FACTORS IN COMMON LAW ADJUDiCATION 
sources for a body of law that remained essentially judge-made in 
character. Hence， inGray's definition of it， the actual law of a state 
or society was the law that was to be found embodied in the rules 
laid down by the courts， for purposes concerning the determination 
of substantive legal rights and duties.l山 Fromthis Gray took it to 
follow that the establishing of law depended on the decisions of the 
courts， inthe sense that it was to be assumed that there was no 
????
law prior to judicial decisions， and to follow also that the activities 
of the courts in their deciding of disputes and controversies were to 
be thought of as involving the ex post facto making of law.'日i
Gray was an orthodox legal scholar， and the emphasis that he 
placed on the judge-made nature of law was not such as to imply 
any serious challenge on his part to the traditional procedures of 
adjudication， as these were followed by the American courts of his 
own time. In contrast to Gray， however， realists Iike Llewellyn and 
Frank were veη1 much concerned to bring into question the integ-
rity of the establi日hedprocedures of adjudication and methods of le醐
gal reasoning. In this respect， their work stands in opposition to， as 
it in fact served to counteract， the formalism that had come to 
dominate thinking about the law in the United States during the 
decades before the emergence of the mainstream realist movement 
at the beginning of the 1930s. The dominance of the formalistic 
style of thinking about the law in this period was reflected in the 
popularity in the American law schools of the so白calledcase method 
of legal education. 
The case method of legal education was c10sely associated with 
the Harvard Law School following the appointment of Christopher 
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Columbus Langdell (1826-1906) as its Dean in 1870.τ'he formalis-
tic approach to law that Langdell promoted with the case method 
had a profound influence on American legal culture 合omthe late 
1870s up加 the1920s. Informing the case me出odwas a quite spe-
cific view as to the essential nature of law and adjudication. In this 
view of it， the law was understood to be a logical science， which 
comprised a system of general， logically inter-connected principles 
and doctrines. These formal legal principles and doctrines were as輔
sumed加 becapable of being established through出edetailed ex-
amination of the existing case law in which they were embodied， 
and then of being adopted as the basis for the decision of the actual 
cases submitted to the courts for adjudication and for the derivation 
of出especific rules that were necessary to support and justiちrsuch 
decisions. 
For Langdell， then， the law was held to be a science， and， in 
consequence of this， the formalist view of law that he argued for 
was one that tended to involve the appeal to a rigorous standard of 
legal certainty.τもiswas so in the sense that it was assumed that 
the adjudication of disputes by the courts was always 旬 bebased in 
the application of the system of principles and doctrines which were 
embodied in the case law， and which， for this reason， were to be 
taken to stand as the established sources of the law. At the same 
time， Langdell held that al the available materials of the science of 
law were to be found in written form in the law books， which books 
were to be understood as standing as the ultimate sources of the 
whole of legal knowledge. The identification that Langdell made of 
law with the written law laid down in books was essential to his 
??
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case method of legal education. Hence the case method that Lang-
dell followed was one that encouraged the separation of legal educa-
tion from other academic discipines. 80 also did it encourage a gen-
eral acceptance of the formalist view that the law in practice， and 
for the purposes of the study of it， was to be thought of as some-
thing that existed in more or less complete independence 企omother 
social norms， and from the conditions that governed its actual appli‘ 
cation and functioning in society.'141 
The maintenance of the firm distinction between law and soci鍋
ety implicit in the formalistic approach to legal education of Lang-
dell and his followers was not acceptable to realists like Llewellyn 
and Frank. For the mainstream realists， the law was to be thought 
of as having its life only within the concrete sphere of society con舗
sidered in its entirety. In consequence， the mainstream realists 
proceeded on the assumption that the law was to be described and 
explained through attention to the circumstances of its interaction 
with the social whole of which it was a part. In the case of Llewel-
lyn， this meant that the law was to be described and explained by 
reference to its relation to， and its impact on， the actual behaviour 
of men in society. This was the position that Llewellyn defended， 
and made integral to the realist project in jurisprudence， in‘A Real-
istic Jurisprudence: The Next 8tep'. The central argument that 
Llewellyn set out in the article was that existing jurisprudence had 
been too much concerned to identify the substance of the law with 
rules of law， and with the rights which were加 befound laid down 
and expressed in such rules. This， e日sentially，was the orthodox 
view of law associated with formalist jurisprudence， and， against it， 
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Llewellyn maintained that the ru1es of substantive 1aw， and the 
rights that they provided for， were to be understood in terms of 
their relation to the behaviour of 1egal officials and ordinary lay-
men. Hence he emphasized， as one his principal lines of argument， 
that 
substantive rights and rules should be removed from their 
present position at the focal point of legal discussion， infa-
vor of the αreαof contαct between judicial (or 0担cial)be-
hαuior and the behαuior of laymen; that the substantive 
rights and rules should be studied not as self-existent， nor 
as a major point of reference， but themselves with constant 
reference to that area of behavior-contacts.1日i
Llewellyn did not only oppose himself to the formalism of Lang-
dell and the Langdellian school in jurisprudence through the em-
phasis that he placed on the interrelationship of law and society， as
this was manifested in the effects of law on the behaviour of legal 
o出cialsand laymen within society. He also brought into question 
the particular ideal of legal certainty that was implied in the for-
malist view of law. He did so through his insistence that legal 
rules， as such and in themselves， provided no fully reliable basis for 
predicting the outcomes of the cases that went before the courts for 
decision. 
Crucial， here， was the distinction that Llewellyn drew in ‘A Re-
alistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step' between what he called pα:per 
rules and rights and what he called reαl rules and rights. As Llew-
β: 
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ellyn explained the distinction，‘paper' rules and rights were the 
rules and rights that were to be found set down and embodied in 
the written sources of the law. In contrast to paper rules and 
rights， there were the so・named‘real'rules and rights. These were 
rules and rights that were to be identified， and conceived of， in 
te1'ms of behaviour， and rules and rights whose meaning was to be 
grasped and explained only through reference t冶 theactual practice 
of the courts in the context of particular cases. 
Llewellyn distinguished between paper rules and rights and 
real rules and rights in terms such as to underline that legal rules， 
in the form in which they were understood in traditional jurispru-
dence， were not to be thought of as playing an absolutely decisive 
controlling 1'ole in the p1'ocess of adjudication. In Llewellyn's view， 
it was a fundamental erro1' to regard formaI rules of law as p1'e-
scriptive rules which the courts automaticaIly adhered to in render舗
ing their decisions， and hence as rules which were to be pointed to 
so as to provide the basis for a precise and accurate description of 
judicial behaviour. On the contrary， Llewellyn emphasized that the 
actual practice of the courts frequently diverged from the accepted 
rules of law. In consequence of this， itfollowed， for Llewellyn， that 
it was essential to turn to judicial behaviour as it manifested itself 
in the practice of the courts， rather than to paper rules and 1'ights， 
in o1'de1' to identiちTthe law that was actually， and in real terms， be-
.fi ing maintained and enforced within society.1附
74 
For Llewellyn， then， the proper understanding of law and adju-
dication required that the jurist should remain sceptical about 
claims to the effect that legal rules stood as a su伍cientbasis for 
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Politics No.29.2000 
the determination of judicial decisions. It was very much in accor-
dance with this scepticism about legal ru1es that Llewellyn sug-
gested， in the part of‘A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step' 
where he explained the proper approach to be taken regarding the 
place and understanding of paper lega1 ru1es， that it was necessary 
to be prepared， among other things， tocompare official paper rules 
with actua1 judicial behaviour， toexamine the actual uses made of 
legal rules by judges and lawyers in the circumstances of speci伍c
cases， and to ascertain when the rules referred to by judges and 
lawyers were， and were not， in fact being followed by them in arr甘鴫
ing at particular decisions.1日l
However， mere scepticism about the effectiveness of legal rules 
in controlling adjudication， and in determining judicial decisions， 
did not prove satisfactory to Jerome Frank. Frank's two most im-
portant contributions to realist jurisprudence were Lαωαnd the 
Modern Mind (1930)，18 and Courts on Triαl (1949).1¥il1 1n these 
works， Frank followed Llewellyn in holding that judicial decisions 
were the essence of the 1aw， and that formal legal rules were to be 
thought of as indeterminate with respect to the decisions of the 
courts. Even so， Frank a1so emphasized that the sort of scepticism 
entertained by realists like Llewellyn as to whether legal rules con鵬
tr叫ledadjudication arose from an excessive concern on their part 
with the practice of the higher courts. As a counter to this， Frank 
ar♂led that attention to the workings of the ordinary trial courts 
would bring out that judicial decisions were not to be thought of as 
arbitrary on1y for the reason that rules were indeterminate in the 
sort of respects pointed to by Llewellyn and like国mindedrealists. In 
[I-
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Frank's view， attention to the ordinary trial courts would also serve 
to bring out that judicial decisions were arbitrary for the even 
stronger reason that the examination by the courts of the facts of 
the cases that legal rules were applied to remained subject to dis-
putes and disagreements， such that court judgments about the facts 
of cases were unavoidably steeped in arbitrariness. 80， for example， 
Frank maintained that court judgments about the facts of cases 
were arbitrary because always influenced by personal factors， with 
the result that he was led， through this fact-sceptical form of real-
ism， tounderline how judicial outcomes were characteristically de-
termined by the racial， religious， political and other prejudices of 
trial judges and jury members.1201 
It Is clear合omwhat has been said that the realist critique of 
law involved quite radical claims as to the nature of law. The most 
radical of the c1aims made by the realist thinkers regarding law 
was the c1aim that the essential substance of the law was to be 
found not in the rules and principles that stood as the formal 
sources of the law， but in the decisions made by the courts in the 
context of actual disputes， and hence in the actual behaviour of 
judges and other legal officials. This， as we have seen， was a claim 
about law that was advanced， albeit with .different meanings and 
significances， by Holmes， Gray， Llewellyn and Frank. 
The principal defect of the realist analysis of law is the neglect 
li by the realist thinkers of what is perhaps most appropriately re-
ferred to as the normative dimension of the law. This is the dimen同
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sion of the law that relates to the law considered in its status as a 
system of norms possessing an inescapable binding force in respect 
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of action and deliberation， and hence the dimension of the law that 
relat剖 tothe law as a system of rules and principles providing nor駒
matively compelling grounds and reasons for action and for delib-
eration about action. The explanation for the neglect of the norma-
tive dimension of the law by the realists lies precisely in their claim 
that the essential nature of law was to be found not in the rules 
and principles comprising the formal sources of the law， but in ac-
tual court decisions and in the actual behaviour of judges and legal 
officials. For the identification of the law with court decisions， and 
with the behaviour of judge自andlegal officials， ishardly to be rec-
onciled with two ideas which must be taken to be integral to the 
veηT concept of law and adjudication as such. The first of these 
ideas is the idea that courts， and more particularly judges and legal 
officials， are to be considered as bound to act in conformity with the 
rules and principles embodied in the formal sources of law， and so 
as bound to explain and justi今 theirdecisions in actual cases in 
terms of， and through reference to， what is contained and present in 
the formal sources of law. Second and related to the first idea， 
there is the idea that courts， and hence in particular judges and le国
gal officials， are to be considered as bound to act to decide cases in 
conformity with the established rules and principles of procedure 
that serve to define the specific institutional obligations and respon-
sibilities which fal on judges and legal officials. 
The two ideas about law， as stated above， are such that while 
the law may indeed be presented as something that is to be estab嶋
lished through the judicial decision of actual disputes， the fact re-
mains nevertheless that the decision of disputes by the courts is not 
一五。
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for that reason to be thought of as being arbitrary or unpredictable 
(as the realist critique of law implied that it iゅう butIs rather to be 
thought of as a process of decision-making that stands as subject. to 
its own internal constraints and disciplines. 80， for example， the 
court.s， and in a particular sense judges and legal officials， are to be 
thought of as subject t.o the constraints that are imposed through 
the disciplines implicit in the specifically legal， orjudicial， modes of 
reasoning and deliberat.ion. 80 also are the courts， and judges and 
legal officials， tobe thought of as subject to t.he constraints imposed 
through the framework of established procedures and institutionally 
defined official obligations and responsibilities which apply to the 
courts and to judges and legal officials. The constraints here re-
ferred to comprise an integral part of the normative dimension of 
law and adjudication. It is in their normative dimensIon that they 
stand as constraints that serve to order the processes through 
which cases are decided by the courts， and to limit and restrict the 
considerations that are to be admitted by the courts， and by judges 
and legal officials， in the formulation， issuing and justification of 
their decisions in cases. 
?
?
? ?
?? ?
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The constraints to which the courts， and judges and legal ofi-
cials， are to be thought of as subject do not pertain only to the nor-
mative dimension of law and adjudication. They pertain also to the 
internal structure of adjudication as a quite distinct process of 
decision-making. The internal structure of the process of adjudica白
tion was not central to the realist critique of legal phenomena in 
the behaviour-oriented form in which Llewellyn expounded it in ‘A 
Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next 8tep'. However， the internal 
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structure of adjudication was a principal concern of LlewellyY向 in
The Common Lαw Tr，αdition， where this was pointed to and ex-
plained by him in order to counter and def国土 claimsto the e偽ct
that the decisions of the courts were arbitr田'Yand unpredictable. 
2. Llewellyn and Common Law Adjudication 
Llewellyn wrote The Common LαwTrαdition in response to 
what he saw as a crisis of confidence within the American legal pro-
fession during the 1950s as to whether the decisions of the United 
States appellate courts of that time had been achieving an accept-
able degree of predictability， or， as he put it， ofreckonabi1ity. The 
position that Llewellyn took regarding this crisis of confidence in 
The Common Lαω Tradition was that the decisions of the United 
States appellate courts were to be thought of as acceptably predict値
able or reckonable， and hence that judicial decision-making at the 
level of the appellate courts was to be thought of as rising旬 a
proper and passable standard of stability and re伊larity. To sup-
port this position， Llewellyn pointed to certain features of the tradi-
tion of common law adjudication at the appella胞 courtlevel in the 
United States which he saw as working to promote stability創ld
reckonability of result in the decision of the cases submitted to the 
appellate courts. 
In al， Llewellyn picked out fourteen such features of common 
law adjudication at the appellate court level. These he referred to 
as steαdying factors， and listed as follows: 
????
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1. Law-Conditioned 0貸icials.
2. Legal Doctrine. 
3. IむlownDoctrinal Techniques. 
4. Responsibility for Justice. 
5. One Single Right Answer. 
6. An Opinion of the Court. 
7. A Frozen Record from Below. 
8. Issues Limited， Sharpened， and Phrased in Advance. 
9. Adversary Argument by Counsel. 
10. Group Decision. 
1. Judicial Security and Honesty. 
12. A Known Bench. 
13. The General Period-Style and Its Promise. 
14. Professional Judicial 0値ce.121
The steadying factors that Llewellyn identified were factors 
that， inhis explanation of them， related to the normative dimension 
of law and adjudication. At the same time， they were factors that， 
again as he explained them， pertained to the internal structure and 
organization of common law adjudication as a process of decision-
making， and that for this reason served to underline the internal 
discipline and order which belonged to this tradition of judicial 
iY practice. 
七
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i. The Steadying Factors in Common Law Adjudication 
The first steadying factor in common law adjudication that 
LlewelIyn discussed was a factor that concerned the standing of the 
official personnel who were involved in the United States appellate 
courts. ThIs was that the court officials were law司conditionedof{i二
cials. The consideration that Llewellyn wanted to emphasize here 
was that judges， and other such official personnel， were trained and 
experienced lawyers， and that for this reason they would be inclined 
to see issues， and to see significances in issues，仕omthe perspective 
of the law itself. In addition to this， Llewellyn emphasized that the 
legal conditioning of the officials associated with the United States 
appellate courts was such that the officials would be taught to think 
not just as lawyers， but as American lawyers.'2:1.J 
As a second steadying factor in common law adjudication， Llew町
ellyn pointed to the role played in the judicial process by legα1 doc-
trine. In LlewelIyn's view， itwas an important truth about the pro-
cedures followed by the United States appellate courts that the dis-
cussion of matters submitted for adjudication， and the decision of 
the same， always took place in a containing context for discussion 
and decision which worked to shape and direct the decision-making 
process. This context was set by the body of existing legal doctrine. 
Thus the body of legal doctrine， for Llewellyn， formed a framework 
that served to control the decision of cases which left no room for 
doubt and to guide decisions in doubtful cases. At the same time， 
the framework for judicial decisiorトmakingformed through legal 
doctrine was such that it served to constrain the courts to decide 
???
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even problematic hard cases in accordance wi出 atleast the spirit of 
some part or other of the available legal doctrine. As Llewellyn ex-
plained the matter， the body of legal doctrine available to the courts 
consisted of explicit rules of Iaw， such as the rules contained in the 
statutes. In addition， legal doctrine was presented by him as in-
cluding the general legal concepts， principles and ideals that were 
impIicit in， and involved in， the orga凶zationand interpretation of 
the authoritative material sources of the law. Despite the great im-
portance that Llewellyn attached to legal doctrine as setting the 
context and framework for judiciaI decision-making， itshould be 
noted that he emphasized， as a counter consideration in qualifica-
tion of the second steadying factor， that with any case submitted to 
the appellate courts for decision the consulting of the authoritative 
legal doctrines would stil1 allow for more than one possible out-
1231 come. 
????
In the event， LlewelIyn did not ∞nsider that the United States 
appellate court were merely to decide伺 sesin accordance with the 
terms of established legal doctrine. The courts were also to decide 
cases in accordance with what were recognized to be the co町'ect
techniques for the using of， and working with， the authoritative doc-
trinal materials. Hence the third steadying factor in common law 
adjudication that Llewellyn picked out was the preparedness of the 
appellate courts to adopt， and to follow， the known doctrinal tech-
niques. This steadying factor was qualified by Llewellyn with the 
counter consideration that血eknown and recognized correct tech. 
niques for using， and working with， the authoritative materials 
were techniques which allowed for wide discretion， oras he put it 
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wide leeways， such as to make possible the producing of some con-
siderable variation in result in decisions.1241 
In emphasizing the place of legal doctrine and known doctrinal 
techniques in the American appella加 judicialprocess， Llewellyn 
gave recognition to the concern of the United States appellate 
courts to render their decisions formally consistent with也eterms 
and provisions of existing law. With the fourth and fifth steadying 
factors in common law adjudication， Llewellyn moved from consid-
erations tha土wereto do with the form of the court decisions to con-
siderations that were to do more with their substance. Thus the 
fourth steadying factor was what Llewellyn saw as the prepared-
ness of the appellate cou此sto act in acceptance of what he called a 
responsibiliち，for justice. Here， Llewellyn underlined that the deci-
sions of the appellate courts were stable and regular in part be-
cause the courts acted to decide cases in accordance with， ashe put 
it， some deeply felt need， duty and responsibility on their pa此 for
reaching decisions which were just. In qualification of this， Llewel-
lyn added the counter consideration that there existed a potential 
conflict between the concern of the courts to do justice and the pres刷
sure on the courts to act in conformity with the terms of legal doc-
trine.I251 The fi氏hsteadying factor that made for stability and reck.司
onability in the United States appella担 courtdecisions was what 
Llewell戸1saw as the preparedness of the courts to decide cases on 
the premise that cases submitted for decision were such that the de-
ciding of them admitted， inprinciple， of only one single right αル
1261 swer. 
The next seven steadying factors that Llewellyn saw as making 
pg 
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for reckonability of result in common law adjudication were factors 
that we1'e to do with such conventions adopted by the United States 
appellate cou1'ts as concerned the manner in which the courts Is-
sued decisions and the manner in which cases were p1'esented to 
the courts for decision， and as concerned the organization， privileges 
and composition of the courts. 
Thus the sixth steadying factor in common law adjudication 
that Llewellyn picked out was that the decisions of the United 
States appellate courts were gene1'ally presented in the fo1'm of an 
opinion of the court. Crucial among the considerations set out， in
Llewellyn's explanation of this steadying factor， was that the deci崎
sions of the appellate courts were supported by published opinions 
which stated the grounds for decisions reached. Another considera-
tion， he1'e， was that published opinions had a prospective， forward-
looking effect and function in indicating how comparable cases were 
to be decided in the future.I"71 
The seventh steadying facto1' was that the cases submitted to 
the United States appellate cou1'ts ゐl'decision were presented in 
the fo1'm of a介。'zenrecord 斤ornbelow. What Llewellyn meant by 
this was that the factual material relating to cases submitted to the 
appellate courts was always strictly circumscribed， such that new 
facts pertaining to cases were not to be allowed to disturb， distract 
or alte1' the official record of the cases， as these we1'e presented to 
the courts.1制?
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The eighth steadying factor was that such matters as were prか
sented to the United States appellate courts fo1' decision were pre圃
sented as issues that had the form of issues lirnited， shαrpened，αnd 
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phrased inαdvαnce. What this meant， for Llewellyn， was that mat-
ters coming before the appellate courts for decision were issues 
which were presented by lawyers in the context of the framework 
set by established legal doctrine and procedure， and issues which 
were also presented in explicit language. The result of this focusing 
in the prl倒 entationof issues， as Llewellyn explained it， was出atit 
worked to limit and restrict the scope for discussion and reflection 
by the appellate courts， and hence also to limit and restrict the 
lines and paramete悶 ofjudicial decision-making.I291 
The ninth steadying factor was that the United States appellate 
courts arrived at their decisions only subsequent to the presentation 
of relevant materials through αdversαry argument by counsel. In 
Llewellyn's explanation of the matter， the ωnvention of adversary 
argument by trained counsel in the submission of cases for decision 
to the appellate courts was one that worked greatly to promote 
reckonability in judicial decision-making. For he saw the conven-
tion as serving， among other things， tolocate and point up signifi-
cant issues， togather and focus the .relevant legal authorities， and 
to clari奇rthe likely consequences of the different decisions which 
we陀 beingsought and contended for by counsel. In addition， he 
underlined that the convention of adversary argument by counsel 
served to confront the appellate courts with the relevant legal 
authorities in such a way as to enhance， and to reinforce， the de-
gree of reckonability in judicial decision-making which followed 間
企omthe preparedness of the courts to act in conformity with出e
terms of established legal doctrine.1301 
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The tenth steadying factor was that the decisions of the United 
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States appellate courts were decisions that were taken by groups of 
judges， and so， for that reason， were decisions which were arrived 
at through the process of group decision. According to L1ewellyn， 
group decisions tended to be informed by a broader perspective， and 
by much 1ess extremism， than was the case with the decisions that 
were arrived at by individua1s. Further to this， he pointed out hat 
the convention that appellate court decisions were to be expressed 
in the form of a written group decision was such as to promote 
greater stability， and hence greater reckonabi1ity， in the decision of 
l川1cases. 
The eleventh steadying factor was the factor of Judicial securiか
αnd honesか 1nexp1anation of this factor， Llewellyn emphasized 
that it was an important feature of the United States appellate 
courts that the judges and the courts were afforded institutional se幽
curities against attacks from persons who objected to their deci-
日ions.This， he maintained， had the resu1t of promoting reckonabil-
ity in court judgments and decisions.I;l21 
The twe1fth steadying factor was that the judges sitting in the 
United States appellate courts comprised a known bench， where the 
judges be10nging to particular courts were ab1e to be recognized to 
have their own individual ways of approaching issues， of dea1ing 
with the established 1ega1 authorities， and so on. As L1ewellyn ex伊
plained it， the factor of known benches was a steadying factor that 
worked to make the appellate judicial decision-making process more 
intelligible， and so a1so more predictab1e. Thus he noted， among 
other things， that the appeal judges be10nging to a particu1ar bench 
wou1d tend to deve10p their own traditional manner of work and 
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outlook and of relating旬 oneanother， and that new judges admit-
ted to the bench in question would tend to be broken into the ways 
of its 0恥 goingtradition. While the tradition of a particular bench 
was susceptible to change， and often to rapid change at that， itre-
mained the case， Llewellyn argued， that even when in the process 
of undergoing change， the existing tradition of the bench was some-
thing that was available to be known to some degree or other. In 
addition， LlewelIyn noted that the convention by which the appel-
la旬開urtdecisions were to be supported by signed opinions， and 
the convention by which the votes for and against decisions were to 
be recorded， were such as to allow for study of the individual views 
of sitting judges.'田i
The thirteenth steadying factor in common law adjudication 
that Llewellyn picked out was the one to which he devoted the 
greatest attention in The Common LαwTrα:dition. This was the 
factor that he called the general period田styleαndits promise. 13<1 
What Llewellyn meant in referring to period style was the idea of a 
distinct form or way of legal thought and practice. Thus as he de-
fined it， a period style in the law was 
the general and pervasive manner over the country at 
large， atany given time， ofgoing about the job， the general 
outlook， the ways of professional knowhow， the kind of 
thing the men of law are sensitive to and strive for， the 
tone and f1avor of the working and of出eres叫ts.1制
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In his explanation of the thirteenth st泡adyingfactor in The 
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Common Lαw Trαdition， Llewellyn drew and developed a funda闘
mental distinction between two identifiable period styles in law and 
adjudication， which， as he argued， had been adopted by the Ameri-
can courts during different times in the history of the United 
States. First， Llewellyn picked out a period style that he called the 
Gr，αnd Style 01' the Common Lαw. In Llewellyがsspecification of it， 
the grand style of common law adjudication was one where the 
courts followed， and acted in accordance with， established prece-
dents， as the authoritative sources of the law. However， itwas also 
a style of adjudication where， as Llewellyn emphasized， the prece-
dent rules remained subject to certain forms of interpretation， or 
testing， by the courts. Hence the grand style of adjudication was 
one where precedent rules were tested by the courts through consid-
eration of the standing of the judges who had set the prece-
dents. At the same time， the grand style was one where precedent 
rules were tested through consideration of the general principles 
that informed them， and where this was done with a view not only 
to establishing order among the rules， but also to establishing the 
proper meaning， or sense， of the rules. In addition， the grand style 
was a style of adjudication where precedent rules were tested by 
the courts through consideration of their relation to policy， that is， 
through consideration of the prospective consequences of the prece-
dent rules with which the courts were concerned. Thus did Llewel咽
lyn describe the type of legal thought that he saw as being charaひ
teristic of a time or period when the grand style was pl' 
九
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The type-thinking of the time is to view precedents as wel-
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come and ve巾 persuasive，but it is to test a precedent al-
most always against three types of reason before it is ac幽
cepted. The reputation of the opinion-writing judge counts 
heavily (and it Is right reason to listen carefully to the 
wise). Secondly，‘principle' is consulted to check up on 
precedent， and at this period and in this way of work ‘prin-
ciple' means no menろverbaltool for bringing large骨scaleor-
der into the rules， itmeans a broad generalization which 
must yield patent sense a自wellas order， ifit is to be ‘prin齢
ciple.' Finally，‘policy'， interms of prospective consequences 
of the rule under consideration， comes in for explicit exami-
nation by reason in a further test of both the rule in ques・
tion and its application.I^61 
Llewellyn claimed that the grand style in the common law had 
prevailed in the United States from the 1800s to the 1870s.ilol 1n 
his view of it， the grand style was the best style of adjudication. It 
was also the style of adjudication that he saw as enhancing stability 
and reckonability of outcome and result in judicial decision-
making. This， as he explained it， was so for three reasons. First， 
the grand style of adjudication provided for procedures that served 
to resolve and overcome conflicts as between the legal rules laid 
down in the authoritative sources of the law and the intuitively 
compelling demands of justice. Second， the grand style was one 
that involved the courts moving to make their decisions consistent 
not only with the formal language of the legal authorities， but also 
with the underlying reason of the legal authorities. Third， the 
八
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grand style was a forward-Iooking style of adjudication， inthe re-
spect that it was a style where the courts concerned themselves 
with the prospective or future consequences of the legal rules which 
they were to apply. Hence the grand style was a style of adjudica-
tion that involved procedures of reasoning and decision-making 
which permitted the courts to work for the improvement of the ex幽
isting rules of law. As Llewellyn put it: 
On reckonability of result， three points cry for attention: 
first， the Grand Style is the best device ever invented by 
man for drying up that free-flowing spring of uncertainty， 
conflict between the seeming commands of the authorities 
and the felt demands of justice. Second， when a frozen text 
happens to be the crux， toinsist that an acceptable answer 
shall satおか thereasonαs wellαs the language is not only 
to escape much occasion for divergence， but to radically re-
duce the degree thereof. . Third， the future-directed quest 
for ever better formulations for guidance， which is inherent 
in the Grand Style， means the 01トgoingproduction and im-
provement of rules which make sense on their face， and 
which can be understood and reasonably well applied even 
by mediocre men. Such rules have a fair chance to get the 
same results out of very different judges， and so in truth to 
hit close to the ancient target of‘laws and not men.' t持I
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1n Llewellyn's specification of it， then， the grand style of the 
common law was a style of adjudication where the courts were not 
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restricted to the rules that were to be found set down in the formal 
sources of law as the basis for the decision of cases. On the con幽
trary， the grand style of adjudication was one where the courts pro醐
ceeded to move beyond the formal rules of law， soas to decide cases 
through relating rules of law to other norms such as principles and 
policies， and， indoing this， todecide cases in such a way as加 cre制
at必overallorder and sense within the law. It was， here， that there 
was the greatest contrast between the grand style of the common 
law and the period style that Llewellyn called the Formα1 S~yle of 
law and adjudication. 
The formal style of law and adjudication， inLlewellyn's account 
of it， was a logical， authoritarian style of adjudication， and it was 
the style that he claimed had begun to acquire the status of the or-
thodox ideology in American legal thought and practice during the 
1870s and 1880s. This style was one where cases were decided by 
the courts through reference to the established rules of law， which 
rules of law were assumed to be formally decisive. The formal style 
was also a style of adjudication where matters of policy， and even 
matters concerning changes to the substance of the common law， 
were understood to be matters which were to be settled by legisla-
tive institutions rather than as matters which were to be addressed 
and settled by出ecourts. Yet further， the formal style was a style 
of adjudication where when principles were appealed to and applied 
by the courts， then this was done to resolve problems conceming 
anomalous cases or rules， rather than， as with the grand style of 
the common law， toestablish the overall meaning and sense of the 
law. As Llewellyn put it: 
J_ ノ、
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The Formal Style is of peculiar interest to us because it set 
the picture against which al modern thinking has played-
call it， as of the last eighty or ninety years，‘the orthodox 
ideology.' That picture is clean and clear: the rules of law 
are to decide the cases; policy is for the legislature， not for 
the courts， and so is change even in pure common law. 
Opinions run in deductive form with an air or expression 
of single-line inevitability. ‘Principle' is a generalization 
producing order which can and should be used to prune 
away those ‘anomalous' cases or rules which do not fit， such 
cases or rules having no function except， in places where 
the supposed ‘principle' does not work well， to accomplish 
sense -but sense is no official concern of a formal-style 
_.J..i:lりicourt 
The idea of period style in law and adjudication， and the dis-
tinction that Llewellyn drew between the grand日tyleand the for-
mal style， occupied a central position in the argument of The Com-
mon Lαw Tr，αdition. For it was Llewellyn's contention that the 
emergence of the formal style of law and adjudication had created a 
false image as to what the United States appellate courts were do圃
ing， and as to what they were supposεd to be doing. It was the 
prevalence of this formal-style image of law and adjudication， Llew-
ellyn claimed， that was to be regarded as the m勾orcause for the 
crisis of confidence among the members of the American legal pro幽
fession as to the stability and reckonability of appellate court 
decision-making which， in The Common Lαw Trαdition， he was so 
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concemed to address and resolve. As for Llewellyn's response to 
the crisis of confidence he identified， the main burden of his argtト
ment in The Common Lαw Tr，αdition was to demonstrate that the 
conformity of the cou此swith the ways of the grand style of law and 
adjudication in fact tended to make for， and to produce， stability 
and reckonability in judicial decision-making. At the same time， he 
demonstrated that to the degree that the United States appellate 
courts in the decades before 1960 had achieved a high level of reck-
onability， then this was to be accounted for by the fact that the 
practice of the appellate courts during that period involved fidelity 
on their part to the ways of the grand style of common law adjudi-
cation. 
The fourteenth and final steadying factor in common law adju-
dication that Llewellyn picked out in The Common LαW T71αdition， 
as a factor working to enhance reckonability of result in the appel-
late judicial decision-making process， was the factor that the 
judges -that is， the men who actually arrived at and issued 
decisions -were the incumbents of a professional judicial ofice. Ac-
cording to Llewellyn， the 0伍cialstatus of judges was a factor that 
worked to constrain judges such that they would act to promote sta-
bility and regularity in judicial decision開making. For， as he ex-
plained， the principle of professional judicial 0出cemeant that the 
judges were subject to the demands or pressures that went with the 
judicialo由ce，and so were compelled through the institutional co任
straints of office to aim to be selfless and impartial. Despite this， 
there was no suggestion on Llewellyn's part that the institution of 
the judicial office was such as to produce uniformity in the decisions 
l羽
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reached by holders of the 0節ce.The factor of the person remained 
highly important， Llewellyn emphasized， and the reckonability in 
appellate judicial decisions that came with judges occupying an 0ι
fice was not to be mistaken for complete predictability.'叫
i. The Steadying Factors in Common Law Adjudication As-
sessed 
The analysis and explanation that Llewellyn made of the 
steadying faclors in American appellate court adjudication was the 
cen白羽1component of his defence of the common law tradition as a 
tradition of law and adjudication that was based in a stable， regular 
and reckonable process of judicial decision-making. To the extent 
that Llewellyn was prepared in 1960 to defend the common law 
through reference to what he identified as its integral steadying fac-
tors in adjudication， then to this extent it must be recognized that 
the Llewellyn of The Common Tradition was involved in a sigr討宣-
cant abandonment of certain of the key elements of the radical cri-
tique of law and adjudication that had been essential to the realist 
project in jurisprudence which he had sponsored in出e1930s. 
As we have seen， Llewellyn in the 1930s followed jurists like 
Holmes and Gray in taking up a court-centred view of law. In do-
ing this， he came to maintain that the real essence of the law lay in 
the substantive decisions of the courts， and not in the legal rules 
and principles that were to be found standing as the formal sources 
of the law. The formal sources of the law， inLlewelIyn's explana-
tion of the matter，∞mprised what he called paper rules and rights， 
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流ndth出合事 heargued， were to be cont1'asted with the so“called real 
ruie邑and which we1'e established through， and embodied In， 
the adual practice， 01' behaviour， of the cou1'ts and of the judges 
:md other legal officials. 1'he emphasis that Llewellyn placed on ju劇
dieiaJ behaviour. as the determinant of 1'eal law， was such that it 
implied出批 theprocess of adjudication was to be thought of as a 
morβnr less arbitrary process of decision.‘making. For in identifシー
けの lawwith court decisions in the .iudicial輸behaviouralterms 
that he favoured， Llewellyn implied that the process of adjudication 
wa詰1'1process of decision-rnaking that was neithe1' founded in nor 
訂ontroHedby the rules and principles which were given in the fo1'市
mal時 U1'Cul:'of the law. 80， at the same time， did he imply thatあ1'-
mal legal rules al1d principles were not to be thought of as deter.陶
工nil1ingthe substantive decisions that the courts ar1'ived at through 
the い定。むes日ofadjudicaむionon a1ひT1'eliable 01' predictable basis. 
The arbitrariness that Llewellyn implied for the process of judト
cial de正~l日ion-making， and the marginal 1'ole that he was p1'epared to 
to formal legal rules and p1'inciples in adjudication， a1'e in司
dicative 01' what has already been pointed to in this paper as the 
eentral defect of the cla臼sicrea1ist critique of law and adjudication. 
This was the failure of Llewel1yn and the mainstream 1'ealists to 
give adequate and prope1' recognition to the conception of law as a 
normative orde1': that is， the conception of law as a system of rules 
and principles which were understood to possess binding no1'mative 
forc弘 andhence to embody normatively compelling 1'easons fo1' ac-
tion and deliberation司
'I'hu日ヲ fo1'example， the classic l'ealist analysis of law and adjtト
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dication was defective in its failure to bring out the respects in 
which the courts， and judges and legal 0:簡 cials，were to be thought 
of as being bound to conform with the rules and principles laid 
down in the formal sources of law， and hence bound to base and jus-
ti命theirdecisions in cases in terms of the legal rules and princi-
ples which were actually established鉱ldin force. 80 also was the 
classic realist analysis defective in its failure to bring out the re・
spects in which the courts， and judges and legal 0伍cials，were to be 
thought of as being bound to decide cases in accordance with the 
rules and principles that served to define the procedures of adjudi‘ 
cation， and to define the specific institutional obligations and re-
sponsibilities of the courts and those of judges and legal ofi-
Then， again， the classic realist analysis was further defective cials. 
in its failure to bring out the respects in which adjudication was to 
be thought of as a process of decision-making that remained subject 
to its own internal constraints and disciplines， including the con・
straints and disciplines which were implicit in the specifically legal， 
or judicial， form of reasoning and deliberation. 
The defects of the classic realist analysis of law， as detailed 
above， were defects of the particular analysis of law that Llewellyn 
set out in 1930 in his seminal article ‘'A Realistic Jurisprudence: 
The Next 8tep'. However， they were defects in the analysis of law 
that Llewellyn successfully avoided when it came 旬 theanalysis of 
law and adjudication that he provided in The Common LaωTradi・一一一一 Thus it is that， as it is argued in this paper， Llewellyn in The tぬ，n.
CommonLαw1子aditionshifted away 合omthe radical realist juris-
prudence of the 1930s， and towards the acceptance of a more ortho-
???
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dox conception of law and adjudication. 
One of the considerations that must be noted， inthis connec-
tion， relates to the view that Llewellyn adopted in The Common 
Lαw Trαdition as to the role played by formal legal rules and prin-
ciples in the process of judicial decision-making. For in contrast to 
the view of this matter that he had taken in the 1930s， Llewellyn in 
The Common Lαw 1子αditionaffirmed the irreducibly normative 
force and standing of legal rules and principles. In doing so， he em-
phasized particularly that legal rules and principles controlled and 
determined the process of judicial decision-making， such that it was 
the fact of出econformity of the courts with the established rules 
and principles of law which was to be understood as making for 
reckonability of result in appellate court adjudication. 
Of obvious relevance， here， iswhat Llewellyn picked out as the 
second steadying factor in common law adjudication. For with this 
steadying factor， Llewellyn pointed to how the context for decision-
making by the United 8tates appellate courts was set by the e玄ist・
ing body of legal doctrine that comprised the explicit rules of law， 
like statutes， and the general concepts and principles that were pre回
sent in the interpretation of the authoritative sources of the 
law. 80， likewise， with the third steadying factor did Llewellyn 
point to how the United 8tates appellate courts acted 加 decide
cases in accordance with existing legal doctrine only through the re-
sort to proper techniques for the use， and application， ofthe estab-
lished doctrinal materials. In al this， it is clear that Llewellyn in 
The Common Lαw Tradition departed from the terms of the cIassic 
realist critique of law and adjudication. This is so for the reason 
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that he no longer presented court decisions as the determinant of 
law. Instead， he presented court decisions as decisions which p1'e-
supposed the existence of antecedently established legal rules and 
principles， and as decisions which were to be suppo1'ted and justi-
fi.ed in terms of their grounding in， and derivation f1'om， these 
authoritative sou1'ces of law. 
There is a further notable respect in which the discussion of 
law and adjudication that Llewel1yn provided in The Common Law 
肝αditiondiverged markedly from the terms of the classic realIst 
critique of law and adjudication， as he had set this out in the 
1930s. This concerns the emphasis that Llewellyn placed on the 
procedures and conventions which he saw as serving to structure 
common law adjudication as a specific process of decision-
making. It has b除ee叩nobserved in t白hiおspa叩pe町rt出ha剖tthe classi詑cr陀ea叫lisはt 
critique of 1担awand adjudication that Llewellyn contributed to in the 
1930昂 wasone where adj‘ljudi記ca以1.ぬnwas presented as a p1'ocess 0ぱf
、
decision-making喝 butone whe1'e litle 01' no effort was made to ex-
plain the process of adjudication in relation to the procedures and 
conventions which the courts were understood to conform with in 
order to decide the cases submitted to them. In The Common Lαω 
Tradition， on the other hand， Llewellyn presented common Iaw ad-
judication， as it was embodied in the ways of the United States ap-
pellate courts， as being a complex institutional practice， and one 
that was understood to be based in procedures and conventions 
which serγed to shape and organize the process of appellate court 
decision-making， and which， on account of this shaping and organiz-
ing of judicial process， served to establish stability and reckonabi1ity 
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in the deci思ionsof the appdlate巴ourts
far the 
adjudication that 
of the steadying factors in common law 
discus出edwere factors that related to 
procedures and conventions of United 8tates appel1ate court 
which went to mark out common law adjudication 
as a distinct institu七ionalpractiむe. 80， fo1' example， the1'e Is the 
firsi steadying・factor. Fι)1'・ thismake悼 itclea1' that吟 fo1'Llewellyn， 
appellate court adjudication wぉsa practice in the respect that court 
officials were law司condition合doffieials， and hence persons who were 
1'equired to be 
tion throuだれ
to fbllow tho ways of the p1'actice of adjudica-
and experien亡命ゐ
Then again‘there are the steadying factors to do with the pro刷
むむdu1'esand conv合ntionsthat L1cweUyn saw as governing the 
proper fonn fo1' the presentation and decision of cases which we1'e to 
be considered by the United 8tates appellate courts. The steadying 
tactor括和協 rnen討nnedヲ are the foHowing: the seventhヲ the
factor that cases submitted to th記 appellatecourts for decision we1'e 
to be pre8ented i註 theform of a f'tozen record from below; the 
eighth， 1;he fador that 1泊w.土erialsgoing before the appellate courts 
were to have the f01'11 01' issues limited， sharpened， and phrased in 
advance; the the fador that ca日esgoing before the appellate 
courts were to be pl'esented through adversary a1'gument by coun-
se1: and th台 the fi是正:torth設tappeHate court decisions we1'e in 
the form of a group decisiol1. Th問。 steadyingfactors COl1cerned 
principks令fforrnal iぉ設djudication.To be 811'e， the pro馳
cedural 
ward 
in question were not such that they were put for-
as who開 observanceby the appellate 
J¥. 
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courts was to be thought of as serving to determine outcomes in 
specific cases in some absolute sense. Nevertheless， they do very 
clearly stal1d out as principles which， for Llewellyn， went to consti-
tute appellate court adjudicatiol1 as a stable and regular practice of 
judicial decision-making. 
Finally， there must be considered the eleventh steadying factor， 
which was to do with the bases of judicial security and honesty， and 
the twelfth steadying factor， which was to do with the convention of 
adjudication by a known bel1ch. These were not factors that con-
cerned formal procedures of adjudication as such. lnstead， they 
were factors that concerned conventions relating to the organization 
of appellate court decision-making that underlined that this was a 
practice of decision-making which was intended to aim at promoting 
integrity and transparency in its results and outcomes. 
The most important respect In which Llewellyn's argument in 
The Common LαI/) Tnαdition reflects a break with the terms of the 
classic realist critique of law and adjudication concerns the view he 
took as to the rational bases of judicial decision-making. The clas-
sic realist definition of law as consisting of court decisions was pre-
sented in terms where it was implied， even if it was not stated ex-
plicitly， that judicial decision-making was arbitrary because it stood 
as a process that was not as such based in any determinate form of 
reasoning and deliberation. In The Cornmon Lαω Tnαdition， how-
ever， Llewellyn very obviously saw common law adjudication， inthe 
form that it was practised in the United States appellate courts， as 
a process of decision-making which was based in a specifically legal， 
or judicial， mode of reasoning and deliberation. lndeed it is clear 
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that， for Llewellyn in The Common Lαw Tr，αdition， the reckonabil-
ity， and the validity， of the appellate court decisions presupposed 
the acceptance by the courts of the constraints and disciplines 
which were bound up with the judicial mode of reasoning as the ap-
propriate and proper method for the making and justification of 
such decisions. 
Most of the steadying factors in common law adjudication that 
we have referred to in detail go to confirm that Llewellyn saw great 
significance in how decision欄makingby the courts was based in， and 
guided through， the legal or judicial mode of reasoning. This is cer‘ 
tainly true of the seventh， eighth and ninth steadying factors that 
Llewellyn picked out. For these are steadying factors that bear 
very directly on the question of the proper form of judicial reason-
ing， in the respect that they are factors relating to the principles of 
procedural propriety that Llewellyn saw as governing the presenta剛
tion of issues and matters to the courts for adjudication. Likewise， 
there are the second and third steadying factors. These concerned 
what Llewellyn saw as the adherence of the United States appellate 
courts to established legal doctrine in the decision of cases， and 
what he saw as the adoption by the courts of appropriate tech鹸
niques for the application of the authoritative legal doctrines. Here， 
Llewellyn once again quite clearly addressed the matter of the form 
of judicial reasoning. For he underlined that the reasoning involved 
in common law adjudication has to be thought of as a specifically 
judicial form of reasoning precisely because it is reasoning that is 
directed to the application of the law， and hence a form of reasoning 
where the authoritative sources of the law must be assigned a spe-
.， 
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cial normative weight and priority. 
The fourth， fifth and sixth steadying factors in common law ad-
judication that Llewellyn picked out are notable in bringing out 1m“ 
por旬ntfeatures of the judicial form of reasoning. The fourth 
steadying factor concerned the general responsibility that Llewellyn 
saw as falling on the United States appellate courts for the doing of 
justice in the decision of cases， even where the pursuit of justice 
was in conf1ict with the determination of the courts to adhere to the 
terms of established legal doctrine. Here、Llewellynpointed not 
only to how the judicial form of reasoning was to be understood as a 
fornl of reasoning that was directed to the application of the law. 
He pointed also to how judicial reasoning was a furm of reasoning 
that was guided by a proper consideration of the truth that justice 
was to be thought of as standing as the ultimate point or purpose of 
the practice of adjudication. 
The fifth steadying factor in common law adjudication that 
Llewellyn picked out was what he held to be the determination of 
t.he United States appellate courts to decide cases on the premise 
that cases involving dispute自submittedfor adjudication admitted of 
only one single right answer. This steadying factor was 01e where 
the logic of judicial reasoning was of central concern. For it was 
here underlined that the judicial form of reasoning adopted by the 
common law courts was not concerned mer叫ywith the provision of 
rationa1izations for arbitrary court decisions. Rather， itwas under-
lined that judicial reasoning was concerned with the reaching of de-
cisions by the courts that were objectively defensible from the 
standpoint of reason， and that were to be presented and justified in 
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terms which were capable of securing rational consent and agree-
ment. In other words， itwas affirmed by Llewellyn， with his speci-
fication of the fifth steadying factor， that the judicial form of reason-
ing was a form of reasoning which involved genuine rational reflec-
tion on law， and which involved the subjection of law to the con-
straints and disciplines essential to the exercise of reason and ωraゅ
tional reflection. 
As for the sixth steadying factor， this also served to underline 
that judicial reasoning was concerned with very much more than 
the rationalizing of arbitrary court decisions. For this steadying 
factor was the factor that the decisions of the United States appel-
late courts were presented in the form of published opinions. This， 
as Llewellyn explained it， was such as to bring out that judicial rea-
soning was not to be thought of as directed at the decision of paト
ticular cases considered in isolation from one another. Rather， judi-
cial reasoning was to be thought of as being directed at the decision 
of cases in terms of the enunciation of rules and principles which 
would have an objectively binding normative force， by virtue of their 
having application to similar and like cases. 
The part of the discussion of the common law tradition that 
most clearly underlines Llewellyn's break with the terms of the 
classic realist critique of law and adjudication is what he wrote in 
explanation of the thirteenth steadying fador in common law adju-
dication. The thirteenth steadying factor was the factor of period 
style in law and adjudication. Central to the explanation of this 
that Llewellyn provided was the distinction that he drew between 
the formal style in law and adjudication and the grand style of the 
?
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common law， as the principal jurisprudentiaI styles that he saw as 
having been adopted by the courts in the United States. This dis-
tinction， inits various ramifications， bears crucially on the question 
of Llewellyn as defender of the common Iaw in relation to Llewellyn 
the radical realist of the 1930s. 
As it was explained in Part 1 of the present paper， the realist 
project in jurisprudence， inthe form that it came to be established 
in the 1930s， was set in opposition to formalist thinking about the 
law and adjudication. Thus realists like Llewellyn rejected the for-
malist view of Iaw as something that was to be thought of as con-
sisting in explicit legal rules and principles. In doing so， the real-
ists came to advance the rival view of law as something that was to 
be thought of as consisting in the substance of court decisions， and 
hence as something that was to be explained in terms of the actuaI 
practice of judges and other legal officials. In The Common Lαw 
Tradition， Llewellyn confirmed the opposition to formalism that 
had been integral to the realist jurisprudence that he had argued 
for in the 1930s. For Llewellyn pointed to the prevalence of the 
formal-style image of law and adjudication as the principal cause 
for what， as he complained in the book， was the widespread misrep-
resentation as to what the practice of the United States appellate 
courts was in fact and what ideally it was meant to be， and hence 
as the principal cause for the crisis of confidence among American 
lawyers about the reckonability of appellate court adjudication 
which was the pretext for his writing the book. 
According to Llewellyn in The Common Lαw Tnαdition， the for-
mal style in law and adjudication was one where rules of law were 
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assumed to stand as the basis for the decision of cases by the 
courts， and where it was assumed that formal legal rules were such 
as to control and determine the process of judicial decision楢making.
Moreover， the formal style in law and adjudication was one where it 
was assumed that the cou吋swere restricted to the formal rules of 
law in the elaboration of the grounds of justifications that they ap-
pealed to in the decision of cases， and one where this restriction 
was assumed to be essential as a precondition for meeting the re・
quirements of legal certainty. Thus the formal style was such that 
the courts were assumed to have no particular responsibilities in 
matters concerning public policy and in matters concerning the sub-
stantive principles ofthe common law， which matters were taken as 
being the concern of legislative rather than judicial institutions. So， 
likewise， was the formal style such that the courts were assumed to 
have no particular responsibilities even for the elaboration of the 
general principles that informed the body of legal rules which they 
were charged with applying. 
It is clear from Llewellyn's discussion of the thirteenth steady-
ing factor that he regarded the formal style in common law adjudi-
cation as inferior to the grand style of the common law. It is also 
clear that the grand style in common law adjudication， as Llewellyn 
specified it， was a style that gave proper recognition， as the formal 
style did not， to certain of the features of law and adjudication 
which he had been most at pains to emphasize in the 1930s in his 
arguments for the realist project in jurisprudence. Thus the grand 
style in common law adjudication was a style where the Iaw was 
recognized to have its life and embodiment in the activity of the 
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courts， and where the courts were recognized to have a constructive 
and creative role to play in the maIntel1ance and development of the 
law through the process of the decision of actual cases. Even 80， it
remain自 thecase that LlewelIyn went far beyond the term8 of the 
reali8t project in jurisprudence of the 1930s with the appeal that he 
made to the grand style as the proper style in law and adjudication， 
which was to be adopted and followed by the courtS. For， as Llewel-
lyn specified it， the grand style was a style in law and adjudication 
where full recognition was given to the normative dimension that 
belonged to the law and to the process of adjudication. 80 also was 
the grand style a style where full recognition was given to adjudica岨
tion as a process of decision幽makingthat remained subject to inter“ 
nal constraints and disciplines， such that it was a process in which 
the decisions of the courts were recognized to stand in need of sup胸
port through the specifically legal or judicial form of reasoning and 
deliberation. 
The grand style in common law adjudication， then， was a style 
that Llewellyn saw as giving recognition to the normative dimen-
sion of law and adjudication， and hence as giving recognition to the 
standing of law as something that embodied an essentially norma-
tive order. This was so in the respect that， inthe grand style of the 
common law， the formallegal rules comprising the law were under-
stood to possess a binding normative force for the courts， and to 
provide normatively compelling grounds of justification for the deci-
sions reached by courts‘ Here， ofcourse， there was a clear parallel 
between the grand style of the common law and the formal style in 
law and adjudication. For Llewellyn was quite explicit that the 
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grand style in common law adjudication， no less than the formal 
style， was a style where the courts accepted that they were bound 
to act in deference to， and in accordance with the terms of， the es咽
tablished precedent rules that stood as the authoritative sources for 
law. Nor should it surprise that Llewellyn identified the fidelity of 
the courts to established rules of law as a distinguishing feature of 
the grand style in common law adjudication. For， after al， Llewel-
lyn saw it as one of the main steadying factors in common law adju-
dication that the courts acted to decide cases in a context set by es-
tablished legal doctrine， and that this body of legal doctrine com-
prised the rules of law that formed the authoritative material 
sources of the law， and the general concepts and principles which 
were involved in the proper judicial inte叩retationof the sources of 
the law. 
ln the event， of course， the grand style in common law adjudi-
cation， in Llewellyn's account of it， was a style of judicial practice 
that was set apart 企omthe formal style in law and adjudication. 
The principal respect in which this was so was that the grand style 
was present泡das a style in law and adjudication where the courts 
were not restricted to the rules comprising the formal sources of the 
law as the grounds of justification available to them for the decision 
of cases. Thus Llewellyn emphasized that it was a characteristic of 
the grand style of the common law that the courts that adopted it 
were directed to look beyond the the rules standing as the formal 
sources of the law， and to appeal to other kinds of norm， such as 
the general principles of law and the general norms of public policy， 
in support and justification for their decisions. ln this， Llewellyn 
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pointed to how the grand style was a style of law and adjudication 
where recognition was given to the role of the law， and more par-
ticularly to the role of the courts， in giving effect to norms that re-
flected the values and interests of the whole order of society. 
Through bringing this out， Llewellyn affirmed the thrust of the clas-
sic realist critique of law and adjudication， asa critique that set it-
self against the sort of formalism in jurisprudence where it was pre-
supposed that law was to be considered in abstraction from the con-
ditions governing its interaction with the containing social order of 
which it was a part. 
In The Common Lαw Trαdition， Llewellyn endorsed the ten-
dency of courts of the grand style of the common law to resort to ar-
guments of principle， and to arguments of policy， inthe decision of 
the cases submitted for adjudication. Nevertheless， there was noth-
ing about this endorsement of the grand style Il1 commOl1 law adju-
dication that involved the implication that adjudicatiol1 was to be 
thought of as an arbitrary procedure of decision-makil1g， or the im-
plication that in judicial decision-making the courts were to be 
thought of as unconstrained by established rules of law and estab-
lished forms of judicial reasol1ing. These were central amOl1g the 
implications of the classic realist critique of law and adjudicatiol1 of 
the 1930s， inthe form in which Llewellyn had contributed to it at 
that time. They were not， however， implicatiol1s carried in Llewel-
lyn's account of the common law tradition， and of the grand style in 
law and adjudication that he saw as the best embodiment of the 
tradition. 
Here， itmust be emphasized that Llewellyn did not claim that 
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the courts that folIowed the grand style were to be thought of as ex-
empt from the constraints， and disciplines， set by established legal 
rules and established forms of judicial reasoning in the appeal that 
they made to considerations of principle and policy in the decision 
of cases. On the contralγ， Llewellyn presented the grand style in 
law and adjudication in terms such that the courts were understood 
旬 makeappeal to considerations of principle and policy in connec-
tion with the interpretation， or as he put it the testing， of the for-
mally established rules of law. That is to say， the grand style， for 
Llewellyn， was a style in law and adjudication where the courts 
were understood to make reference to arguments of principle and 
arguments of policy only in the course of reasoning and deliberation 
on their pa此 thatremained directed at the formal rules of law， and 
at the particular sense and meaning that the formal rules of law 
were taken to have in relation to the cases submitted for decision. 
Thus was the appeal to considerations of principle and policy by the 
courts of the grand style presented by Llewellyn as forming an intか
gral part of what was to be viewed as a disciplined， and internally 
constrained and ordered， procedure of judicial reasoning and delib働
eration. 
Beyond this， itshould be emphasized further that， in Llewel-
lyn's account of the matter， the courts that adopted the grand style 
of the common law were not to be thought of as being concerned 
narrowly with the decision of individual cases in their substantive 
particularity. For Llewellyn， the courts of the grand style were to 
be thought of as being concerned to decide individual cases in胞rms
such that the process of decision“making itself was to serve to pro-
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mote， and preserve， the law in its status as a normative order 
which was based in and transparent to reason， and in its status as 
a normative order which possessed its own sys旬maticcoherence 
and integrity. 
Thus Llewellyn underlined that the grand style of the common 
law was a style of law and adjudication where the courts were to 
decide cases in such a way as to resolve conf1icts between the estab-
lished legal rules and the imperatives of justice. 80， atthe same 
time， did he underline that the grand style of the common law was 
such that the courts that adopted it were to base their decisions not 
only in the established rules of law as these were to be construed in 
their literal meaning， but also in what was 加 betaken as being the 
underlying rationale or reason of the legal authorities. Then again， 
the procedure of decision-making followed by the courts of the 
grand style was a procedure that， as Llewellyn maintained， in-
volved the courts in the continuous generation and improvement of 
rules of law through the decision of cases. These were features of 
the grand style of the common law that underlined the absence of 
arbitrariness from the process of adjudication. Most pa此icularly，
位leywere features of judicial practice in出egrand style that， for 
Llewellyn， pointed to the honouring by the courts adopting this 
style of the ideal of legal certainty which was so closely associated 
with formalism in the law. lndeed， itshould be emphasized， inthis 
connection， that the features of law and adjudication here referred 
to were features that Llewell戸1singled out as pointing to stability 
and reckonability in the outcomes in judicial decision帽making.
The view that LleweIlyn took of common Iaw adjudication in 
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The Common lαω Traditionem must be reckoned as a highly con-
ventional and orthodox one. Thus in this view of adjudication， the 
courts were understood to accept the authority of precedent and 
that of other recognized sources of law， and to decide cases in accor-
dance with the established precedents and rules of law and in ac∞r-
dance with the established techniques for the application of the le-
gal authorities. At the same time， itwas understood that the fidel-
ity of the courts to established legal rules presupposed their adop-
tion of an inclusive approach to the law and its interpreta-
tion. Thus the approach the courts were to take was one where the 
courts were to appeal to considerations of principle and policy in the 
decision of cases， and to act to bring these norms into an integrated 
and systematic relation with the formal sources of the law. It is 
clear from al this that Llewellyn took the view of common law aι 
judication that it was adjudication involving the adoption by the 
courts of the principled approach to the Iaw， where the courts were 
to act not only to apply legal rules to individual cases， but also to 
decide cases in such a way as to maintain the law in its character 
as a system of rules which were founded in a set of consistent and 
mutually reinforcing principles. 
What is here described as the orthodox view of common law ad-
judication is a view that is obviou自lyto be found informing Llewel-
lyn's discussion of the grand style of the common law. However， it
is also to be found present in the discussion of the other steadying 
factors in common law adjudication. This is true of the second and 
third steadying factors， these being the factors to do with the con-
formity of the courts with legal doctrine and with the techniques for 
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the proper working of legal doctrine. It is true too of the fourth 
steadying factor， which related to the acceptance by the courts of a 
responsibility for justice， and true of the fifth steadying factor， 
which related to the working premise of the courts that cases sub-
mitted for decision pointed to one single right answer. Finally， it
merits notice that the orthodox view of common law adjudication 
that Llewellyn argued for in The Common Lαw Tr，αdition stands 
confirmed by his discussion of professional judicial 0伍ceas the 
fourteenth steadying factor. For Llewellyn here underlined that ju-
dicial decision-making was something that belonged to a specific of-
fice， whose incumbents were subject to the institutional duties and 
responsibilities which were essential to the judicial 0釘ice. 80 at the 
same time did Llewellyn here underline that the judicial office was 
such as to incline its incumbents to be impartial in the decision of 
cases， and impartiality must surely be taken to stand as a virtue es-
sential to adjudication as a procedure involving the stable and regu・
lar application of rules of law in accordance with consistent princi-
ples. 
Conclusion 
???
It is evident that the view of law and adjudication that Llewel僻
lyn favoured with his endorsement of the common law tradition was 
one where law and adjudication were present泡das going together to 
form a complex institutional practice. Thus law and adjudication， 
as specific to the common law tradition， were presented by Llewel-
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lyn as comprising an institutional practice that was distinguished 
by the complexity of its internal structure， by the complexity of its 
normative organization and the weight of its normative authority， 
and by出ediscipline and sophistication of the complex forms of rea-
soning and deliberation which it involved as the basis for its e偽c-
tive and regular operation. The account of law and adjudication 
that Llewellyn provided in The Common Lαw 肝αditionwas one 
that transcended the limitations of the realist critique of law and 
adjudication of位le1930s， principally so because of the recognition 
given to the normative quality of law and初出eworkings of the in-
ternal structure oflaw. It was also an account oflaw and adjudica-
tion that served as a corrective to the general thrust and direction 
of realism as a distinct school of jurisprudence. This is so， most no・
tably， with respect to two aspects of classic realist jurisprudence 
that quite particularly reflect the neglect by the realists of the nor-
mative and也einternal structural dimensions of law and adjudica-
tion. First， there is the matter of the positivism of the realist ap-
proach to the law and to i悩 analysis.Second， there is出ematter of 
the instrumentalist view of law that was assumed and appealed to 
by the realists. 
The American realists were apt to think of jurisprudence， inthe 
form that they conducted it， as something that was to involve a 
fully scientific method of enquiry into the nature of legal phenom-
ena. The scientific status that the rea1ists were disposed to attrib-
ute to their enquiries into law goes to underline how they are旬 be
situated in the po帥 ivisttradition in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. The foundations of the positivist tradition in jurisprudence 
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were laid in England during the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries by such legal theorists as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
and John Austin (1790-1859). The positivist tradition was to prove 
dominant in legal thought and practice in England during the twen園
tieth century， as wi旬essthe enormous influence of the positivist 
theory of law expounded by the Oxford legal. philosopher H.L.A. 
Hart (1907-92). 80 also was positivism a dominant tradition in 
twentieth-centurγlegal thought and practice in the U nited 8tates， 
as witness， for example， the positivism characteristic of the socio-
logical school of jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound， and as witnes8 the 
positivist conception of law which is characteristic of the work of the 
American realists themselves. 
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From the standpoint in jurisprudence adopted by Bentham and 
Austin， the study of law wa呂 田cientific，or positivistic， in the respect 
that， for the purposes of study， law was to be considered as a fac-
tual subject-matter of enquiry which called for analysis and descrip-
tion of its nature， tothe exclusion of the study of law in its status 
as a subject-matter which called for judgments as to its value. 
Hence the positivist jurisprudence that Bentham and Austin con-
structed， in both its substantive and methodological aspects， was 
founded in the distinction that in the social sciences is referred to 
as the fact-value distinction. The assumption of this distinction was 
to involve Bentham and Austin， and their positivist successors gen-
erally， inthe endeavoul' to pick out and isolate the law as a subject-
matter of enquiry in terms such that the law was to be thought of 
as something that was quite distinct白羽nother forms of normative 
regulation. 官lispart of the positivist endeavour in jurisprudence 
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Politics NO.29.2000 
led the exponents of positivism to ar伊1efor a clear divide between 
law and normative principles of justice and morality， and， in doing 
80， toinsist that there existed no necessary or conceptually guaran-
teed connection between the law and the final ends of justice and 
morality. The terms of the fact-value distinction， as it was assumed 
by Bentham and Austin， were also such as to involve them in the 
presenting of jurisprudence as a science that comprised a distinct 
form of enquiη， and one that， with respect to its method and 
subject-matter， was to be set apart from the enquiries conducted in 
ethics and normative political theory where principles of justice and 
morality were appealed to in the critical evaluation of the law.'1J 
The distinguishing of UlCts 仕'Om values in the study of legal 
phenomena， the separating of law from the principles of justice and 
morality， and the decoupling of jurisprudential enquiry 企omthe 
concerns of ethics and normative political theory: these were de釘n幽
ing features of positivist jurisprudence that were present aIso as de-
fining features of the American realist jurisprudence as it was ar-
gued for by its classic exponents in the United States in the 1930s. 
lndeed， the positivism of the American realists， in the sense that 
positivism is here understood， iseverywhere apparent in their de咽
termination to direct enquiries in jurisprudence away from law in 
its normative dimension， and towards the adual behaviour of 
judges and legal officials， and so in this way to make of realism a 
science of the observable in judicial practice. Certainly this was so 
with the behaviour-directed approach to the analysis of law and ad刷
judication that Llewellyn made central to the realist project in juris-
prudence at the start of the 1930s.H'1 
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Nevertheless， the absolutism of the positivist dichotomies as be-
tween facts and values， as between law and the ends of justice and 
morality， and as between jurisprudence and the concerns of ethics 
and normative political theory was very much brought into question 
in the arguments that Llewellyn set out in The Common Lαw Tnα-
dition. For the arguments that Llewellyn advanced about common 
law adjudication were such as to bring into question any claim to 
the effect that the rules and principles comprising the law were dis-
tinct from normative principles of justice and morality. To begin 
with， he emphasized that reckonability of result in judicial decision-
making in the common law tradition depended on the preparedness 
of the courts to act not only in deference to the established legal 
authorities， but also to act so as to promote the cause of justice. At 
the same time， he emphasized that the courts that adopted the 
g:rand style in common law adjudication were to decide cases 
through the appeal to general principles and general policies， as 
much as th:rough the application of the formal rules and principles 
of law. Here， obviously， itwas conceded by Llewellyn that princi-
ples of justice and morality were present as integral operative fac-
tors in law and adjudication. For the responsibility for justice that 
he attributed to the courts was such that the courts were to be 
thought of as being compelled to articulate principles for the deter-
mining of what was just. Similarly， the recognition that the courts 
of the grand style were licensed to base their decisions in principles 
and policies opened the way for the appeal by the courts to such 
considerations of justice and morality as would胎nd，characteristi-
cally，加 befound present in the sort of general principles and poli-
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cies in play in common law adjudication. 
The Common Law Trαdition was an essay in jurisprudence， 
and， as such， itset out no critically constructed theory of justice and 
political morality. Despite this， the recognition that Llewellyn gave 
to principles of justice and morality， as considerations in law and 
adjudication， was such as to imply the necessity that the jurist 
should engage in normative theorizing as an essential part of the 
analysis and explanation of law and legal phenomena. 80 also was 
it implied， again much contrarγto the tenets of positivist jurispru-
dence， that reflection on the values associated with the law was to 
be thought of as inseparable from enquiry into the factual subject帽
matter of the law. Here， itshould be noted that Llewellyn's discus-
sion of common law adjudication pointed to the overcoming of the 
positivistic fact-value distinction， inthe respect that this was a dis-
cussion that involved， and indeed demanded， attention to the values 
that were embodied in， and promoted through， the law and the 
process of adjudication. This was so， certainly， with regard to the 
sort of principles of justice and morality that Llewellyn was pre助
pared to accept as serving to shape judicial decision-making. It was 
so also in the even more fundamental sense that the identification 
of steadying factors in common law adjudication itself presupposed 
the making of judgments of value such as would inevitably be 
bound up with determining the underlying point， orpurpose， ofthe 
law being brought to maintain the kind of stability and reckonabil-
ity of result in judicial decision-making which the steadying factors 
were understood to make for. The judgments of value at stake in 
this matter would plainly be to do with judgments as to the propri-
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ety， and desirability， ofthe encouraging of stable expectations re-
garding the law and its enforcement on the part of the subjects of 
the law， and judgments of this sort， no less plainly， would tend to 
touch very directly on the question of the propriety， and desirabi1-
ity， ofthe maintenance of the rule of justice which was to be pre-
served through the law. 
While Bentham and Austin insisted on the independence of the 
form of positivist jurisprudence that they conducted from normative 
forms of enquiry， this did not me問 thatthey were indi飴 rentto the 
normative concerns of ethics and political theory as such. In fact， 
Bentham and Austin expounded a quite specific normative theory of 
law， state and government， and one that they saw as complement-
ing， ifnevertheless one that remained formally separaむein terms of 
method and substance from， their analytical enquiries regarding the 
nature of legal phenomena. This normative theory was the theory 
of utilitarianism. The foundation of utilitarianism lay in the princi-
ple of utility. In Bentham's classic fOl'mulation of it， the principle of 
utility was such that it provided that men were to act， and that the 
institutions of law， state and government were to be organized and 
maintained， soas to promote the greatest happiness of the members 
of the community. From this， itis clear that utilitarianism involved 
an instrumentalist conception of law. For出eprinciple of utility 
provided that law and the institutions of the law were初 bethought 
of as a means， or instrument， for the realization of the ends of the 
collective welfare of the members of society，叩dfor the implemen-
tation of such public policies as were essential for bringing about 
that condition of collective welfare. I胡l
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The view of law as a means or instrument that is presupposed， 
and appealed to， in the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and 
Austin is essentially the same as the instrumentalist view of law 
that is to be found informing various of the leading schools of 
American jurisprudence of the twentieth centuη 州 Onesuch 
school was that oI the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound， 
this being the school where the law was considered in terms of its 
function in securing， and promoting， certain fundamental social in-
terests.1叫 Anothernotable instrumentalist school in twentieth-
century American jurisprudence was that of the economic analysis 
of law， which school has been associated chiefly with the work of 
Judge Richard A. Posner (b. 1939). Thus fo1' the exponents of the 
economic analysis of law， the law and legal processes and institu-
tions， such as， specifically， the processes and institutions bound up 
with the practice of common law adjudication， were to be explained 
in terms of their instrumental fIlnction in promoting the maximiza-
tion of overall total wealth within society， as this was to be deter-
mined in accordance with cl'iteria relating to economic efficiency.14 
The legal 1'ealists too adopted an instrumentalist view of law. 
This was true not least of Llewellyn himself. Thus it was that in 
‘Some Realism about Realism'， Llewellyn elaimed that realism was 
distinguished as a movement in jurisprudence by the adherence of 
its exponents to the conception of the law as something that stood 
as a means to the realization of social ends， rather than as an end 
in itself.147J It was very much in line with this conception of law as a 
means to social ends that Llewellyn was to go on加 setout at the 
beginning of the 1940s his well-known theory of lawサobs. For in 
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this theory， the law and legal institutions and processes were ex-
plained in functional tenns: that is， interms of the basic functions 
or jobs -such as the settlement of disputes， the prevention of dis-
putes， and the allocation of authority and determination of authori同
tative procedures -that LleweUyn held that the law and legal insti-
tutions and processes were to be thought of as discharging within 
society.1胡 l
It is well understood that utilitarianism is defective as a theory 
relat泊gto the nonnative foundations of the law and legal institu-
tions. Of course， there is no denying that utilitarianism is virtuous 
as a normative theory in jurisprudence， for the reason that it under-
lines that law and legal institutions must be directed to serving 
such ends as are essential to the collective welfare of位lecommu-
nity. Nevertheless， the theory remains flawed， and this because it 
fails to give proper recognition that the ends of community welfare 
that law and legal institutions serve to promo飴 areends that are to 
be promoted only within， and through， the framework set by the 
rules and principles， and by the processes and procedures， which 
are internal to the structure of law and legal institutions. 80， for 
example， the terms of utilitarianism are such that no proper ac-
count is provided in the theory for the respects in which the institu-
tions charged with the maintenance of law within the community-
such as the executive agencies of government， the courts and the 
police -are to be thought of as being bound in justice to conform 
with， and to apply， the rules and principles embodied in established 
law， even in circumstances where this in fact proves to constitute 
an impediment to the realization of the collective welfare of the 
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community. Nor， more specifically， does utilitarianism adequately 
account for the respects in which the rules and principles that the 
law-maintaining institutions are to conform with， and to apply， are 
rules and principles that frequently affirm values that are set in op-
position to the values bound up with coIlective community welfare. 
Central， here， are the rules and principles through which recogni-
tion is given in law to the fundamental rights that are understood 
to belong to individuals， where these are considered to stand as 
rights which are not to be set aside to serve community welfare or 
int泡rests.
The defects of utilitarianism as it applies to law are to do with 
the excessive emphasis placed by the theory on the instrumental di-
mension of the law and legal institutions， and with the comparative 
neglect of their normative and internal structural dimensions. In 
this respect， the defects of utilitarianism are essentially the same 
defects as those of the instrumentalist schools of American jurispru-
dence. This is true， for example， of the school of the economic 
analysis of law， since this analysis of law， inits classical form， pre-
supposed that the procedure of common law adjudication was to be 
thought of as a means for the implementing of policy objectives re-
lating to the maximization of social wealth. It is true also of the 
judicial-behavioural approach to the analysis of law and adjudica-
tion pointed to by Holmes， and made central to realist jurispru-
dence by Llewellyn. For in making the substantive decisions of 
judges and legal officials the determinant of actual law， itwas 
clearly implied in the judicial-behavioural analysis of law and adju咽
dication that judges and legal officials were at liberty to decide dis情
。 ?
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putes with a view to giving effect to considerations of social advan-
tage (Holmes)， and giving effect to social ends (Llewellyn). In this， 
however， there was no recognition that judges and legal officials 
were bound to abide by the terms of established law， as an internal 
constraint of procedure in judicial decision-making， and that this 
constraint served to set limits to the judicial endeavour to utilize 
the law in the securing of favoured social objectives. Much the 
same is to be said about Llewellyn and the theory of law-jobs. For， 
here， the instrumental functions of the law were emphasized， but 
without the discussion of these functions being supported by Llewel-
lyn with any proper explanation as to the complexity of the internal 
structure of the institutions and procedures through which the basic 
functions of law， like dispute settlement， dispute prevention and 
authority allocation， were to be fulfilled. 
All this about Llewellyn notwithstanding， itremains the case 
that the defects and limitations of utilitarianism in its application 
to law， and those of instrumentalist thinking about legal phenom-
ena generally， were to a large extent avoided and overcome by 
Llewellyn in his discussion of law and adjudication in The Common 
Lαw Tr，αdition. For， as we have seen， Llewellyn in this work fo-
cused directly on the internal structure of adjudication as a proce帽
dure of decision-making. In doing so， he gave ful recognition to the 
respects in which the procedures of adjudication in the common law 
tradition required that the courts， and court officials， were to con-
form with the terms of established legal doctrine and with the tech-
nical principles of method which governed the application of legal 
doctrine. To be sure， there was no preference for formalism on 
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Llewellyn's part， such that he held that the courts were旬 restrict
themselves to formal rules of law as the grounds of justification for 
the decision of cases. lndeed， he accepted出atthe courts in the 
common law tradition had resorted， and were properly to resort，加
ar郡lmentsof policy in decision-making. Nevertheless， itremains 
vital to grasp that the acceptance by Llewellyn of the role of policy 
considerations in common law adjudication fel f:町 shortof involv-
ing a commitment by him to an instrumentalism where judicial 
decision-making was to be taken to stand as a means for the reali-
zation of collectively defined community ends and 0対ectives. On 
the contrary， the entertaining of ar，♂lments of policy by the courts 
was， for Llewellyn， a feature of the grand style of the common law， 
and， with this style of adjudication， as he explained it， the courts 
were bound to decide cases not with a view to giving effect to in-
strumental considerations， but always with a view to maintaining 
and preserving the law as叙 1integrated and fully self二su部cientsys-
tem of norms， rules and principles. 
As a final consideration， itshould be noted briefly， and very 
much in passing， that the movement away企ompositivism and in-
strumentalism by Llewell戸1，as this is reflected in the ar郡lmentof 
The CommonLαwTrαdition， serves to suggest something of how he 
is to be aligned with American legal theorists of the twentieth cen-
tury who are to be placed as opponents of the realist project in ju-
risprudence. Particularly deserving of recognition here in connec輔
tion with Llewellyn are two jurists who were notably resistant to 
the positivist-utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence: Lon L. Fuller 
(1902-78) 1491 and Ronald Dworkin (b. 1931).[5(1  For Fuller and 
?
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Dworkin stand out as orthodox defenders of the common law style 
of adjudication， and as jurists whose endorsement of common law 
adjudication was couched in terms comparable with those that 
Llewellyn adopted in his endorsement of the grand style of the com-
mon law tradition. This is true， certainly， of the account that 
Fuller provided of the common law and of the features of the com司
mon law that he saw as marking it out as a system of law.I51 As for 
Dworkin in relation to Llewellyn and the grand style of the common 
law， there is the general theory of law and adjudication that in the 
1980s Dworkin was to present as law as integrity. For this was a 
theory where the courts were understood to decide cases， and so 
preserve the systematic quality of the law， not only through the ap-
plication of the formal rules that were contained in the conventional 
sources of law， but also through the elaboration and application of 
the general principles of justice and political morality which， for 
Dworkin， were presupposed as the basis and foundation of the con“ 
ventionallaw established within the community.附
The standpoint in jurisprudence 仕om which Fuller and 
Dworkin wrote was that of natural law.''J' This standpoint， as 
Fuller and Dworkin adopted it， was one that was understood to al-
low for the affirmation of the objective validity of law and legal in酬
はitutions，and for the affirmation of the objective normative force of 
the values which were embodied in the law and given effect to in le-
o gal institutions. Llewellyn is not to be put together with Fuller and 
Dworkin in the natural law tradition. Even so， itis clear that the 
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concerns that Llewellyn had in The Common Lαω Trlαdition were 
very much to do with demonstrating the objective foundations of the 
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law and the values that the law and legal institutions embodied and 
gave effect to. Here， certainly， the Llewellyn of The Common Lαω 
Tr，αdition stands with Fuller and Dworkin in his dissenting from 
the positivist-utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence， and仕omthe as幽
sumptions to do with the ultimate relativism of legal order and le幽
gal values which were bound up with this tradition. 
In the event， however， and with the benefit of hindsight， itis 
proper to observe that there is a datedness about the concern of 
Llewellyn with t~e objective in the law， as this is to be found prゃ
sent in his endorsement of the stability and reckonability of the 
grand style of common law adjudication. For in the years following 
1960， when Llewellyn published The Common Lαw Tr，αdition， there 
emerged in the United States， and elsewhere， schools of thought in 
jurisprudence and legal theory that not only opposed themselves to 
the positivist-utilitarian tradition， but that also served to counter 
the sort of claims advanced by thinkers like Llewellyn， Fuller and 
Dworkin for the integrity of common law adjudication through the 
challenging and subversion of a1 assumptions as to the objective 
validity of the modes of normative regulation which are associated 
with the rule of law. Among these schools are the school自ofcritical 
legal studies and postmodernist jurisprudence.I541 The schools of le-
gal thought here mentioned opened up radical lines of investigation 
regarding legal phenomena， and the radicalism of the jurispruden-
tial enquiries involved was similar in spirit to that of the classic re- e5 
alist critique of law and adjudication of the 1930s. The ultimate 
substance and validity of the arguments about law developed in 
schools such as critical legal studies and postmodernist jurispr仕
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dence for the proper understanding of law in its relation to politics 
and society in the contemporaηsituation are matters which would 
appear to remain very much open to question. What must be taken 
to be beyond question， at least where the concems of the present 
paper are in issue， isthat attention to the arguments of the critical 
and postmodemist jurists serves only to underline the orthodoxy 
and conservatism of the treatment of the common law tradition that 
was provided by Karl N. Llewellyn. 
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what the courts were likely to decide. Related to this， Llewel-
lyn maintained that realists tended to distrust the view that 
traditional rules and rule品rmulations，in their prescriptive as-
pect， were to be thought of as the heavily operative factor in 
the making of cou凶 decIsions.‘SomeRealism about Realism'， 
p.56. 
17. For Llewellyn on the proper approach to be adopted for the un-
derstanding of paper legal rules， see:‘A Realistic Jurispru-
dence: The Ne封 Step'，pp. 23-5. 
18. Jerome Frank， Lawαnd the Modern Mind (1930)， 6th printing 
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with a new Preface (New York: Coward-McCann， 1949). 
19. Jerome Frank， Courts on Tr向上Mythαnd RealiかinAmericαn 
Justice (Princeton， New Jersey: Princeton University Press， 
1949). 
20. For Frank's contrast between the rule-scepticism of jurists like 
Llewellyn and his own fact-scepticism， see his Preface to the 
6th printing of Lαwαnd the Modern Mind of 1949. See also: 
Courts on Tri刀l，Chapters 1-5， especially Chapter 5， pp. 73-7. 
For discussion of Frank's contribution to American legal real-
ism， see: Julius Paul， The Legαl Realism of Jerome N. Fr，αnk:A 
Study of F，αct岨Skepticismαndthe Judicial Process (The Hague: 
Martinus N討hoff，1959)， especially Chapters 1 and 4. The view 
of law that Frank argued for from the perspective of the fact-
scepticism that he favoured was classically realist in its defini-
tion of law in terms of judicial decisions， and in terms of the 
predictions， or guesses， of lawyers concerning such decisions. 
As he put the matter in a well-known passage:‘For any particu-
lar lay person， the law， with respect to any particular set of 
facts， isa decision of a court with respect to those facts so far 
as that decision affects that particular person. Until a court 
has passed on those facts no law on that subject is yet in exis同
tence. Prior to such a decision， the only law available is the 
opinion of lawyers as to the law relating to that person and to 
those facts. Such opinion is not actually law but only a guess 
as to what a court will decide.' Lawαnd the Modern Mind， 
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Chapter 5， p.50. 
21. For Llewellyn on the fourteen steadying factors in common law 
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adjudication， see: CLT， pp. 19--51. 
22. As a ∞unter consideration to what was said in explanation of 
the first steadying factor， Llewellyn entered a note regarding 
what he saw as the vagaries of the professional training and 
work experience of American lawyers. So， for example， he un-
derlined that there was no necessity in the United States that 
the preliminary work or training of the appellate judge should 
relate to preparation for holding the office of judge. CLT， pp. 
19-20. 
23. Llewellyn， CLT， pp. 20-1. 
24. Ibid.， pp. 21--3. 
25. Ibid.， pp. 23-4. 
26. Ibid.， pp. 24-5. 
27. Among the counter considerations to this advanced here， Llew幽
el戸1noted with regret the tendency of the courts to substitute 
memoranda or announcements for full opinions. However， he 
conceded that this did not necessarily have material conse-
quences for the maintenance of steadiness in appellate court 
decision-making. CLT， pp. 26-7. 
28. As a counter consideration to this， Llewellyn added that the 
rule for the freezing of the factual record of cases submitted for 
decision stood compromised in its operation by the acceptance 
by the United States appellate courts of the duty to do justice， 
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explicit in the record. CLT， p.28. 
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drawn. Even so， he noted that， on the larger scale， such action 
was relatively rare， and that it was generally the result of what 
was felt to be some particularly pressing need. CLT， p.29. 
30. As a counter consideration， Llewellyn conceded that under the 
as then prevailing conditions in the United States， the presen-
tation of cases through adversary ar伊 mentby counsel was 
much more often than not likely to reduce reckonability in ap-
pellate judicial decision-making， rather than to enhance 
it. This was so for the reason， among others， that imbalances 
in skill as between different counsel tended to determine the 
outcome of cases in the appellate field to the detriment of pre-
dictability. CLT， pp. 29-31. 
31. As a counter consideration to this， Llewellyn observed， among 
other points， that there were examples of appellate courts in 
the United States where groups of judges were completely 
dominated by one individual judge. CLT， pp. 31-~2. 
32. The factor of judicial security and honesty was one that Llewel-
lyn explained in such a way as to point to the link between the 
independence of the United States appellate courts and reckon-
ability of result in judicial decision-making. Needless to say， 
Llewellyn was quite clear that the cause of reckonability was 
not 加 bethought of as being well served through the subjection 
of the courts to political control. CLT， pp. 32-3. 
33. It should be noted that Llewellyn entered， tothis， the counter 
consideration that there were aspects of the United States ap-
pellate court practice which made it difficult to know in aι 
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vance which of the personnel of the bench would be involved in 
particular cases. Thus some appellate courts sat in divisions， 
and some continually reshuffled their benches. Then again， 
there were always new aηivals on the bench， while， insome 
states， the appeal court judges sat only for short terms. Even 
so， Llewellyn emphasized that such conditions of appellate 
court practice resulted in a diluting， rather than in an elimina-
tion， of the advantages in reckonability that were to be had 
from knowing the personnel of the bench. CLT， pp. 34-5. 
34. For Llewellyn's discussion of the factor of period-style and its 
promise， see: CLT， pp. 35-45. 
35. Llewellyn， CLT， p.36. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Llewellyn claimed that the grand style had been the manner of 
appellate judicial work which had prevailed in the United 
States from the time of the Administration of Jefferson (1801-
9) to the Administration of Grant (1869--1877). On this point， 
see: CLT， p.5. 
38. Llewellyn， CLT， pp. 37-8. 
39. Ibid.， p.38. 
40. Ibid.， pp. 45--50. 
41. The classic works in the English positivist tradition in jurispru-
dence are as follows: Jeremy Bentham， An Introduction to the 
九 Princψlesof Mor，αlsαnd Legislation (1780; first published， 
1789)， ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart CLondon: Athlone Press， 
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1970); John Austin， The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(1832)， ed. H.L.A. Hart (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson， 
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1954). For discussion of the distinction between law and moral-
ity in respect of the positivist tradition in jurisprudence， see: 
H.L.A. Hart， 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Mor-
als'， H.αrvαrdLαw Revie帆 71(1958)， 593-629; rpt. in Hart， Es-
sα:ys in Jurisprudence αnd Philosophy COxford: Clarendon 
Press， 1983)， pp. 49-87. 
42. In ‘Some Realism about Realism'， Llewellyn did write of the di-
vorce of factual considerations from considerations of value in 
the study of legal phenomena as being a temporary divorce， for 
the reason that the divorce of facts and values had to be set 
aside if there was to be change made to the law. Nevertheless， 
he was absolutely clear that the distinction between facts and 
values was to hold in the sense that no judgments of value 
were to be involved in the observation and description of legal 
phenomena， and in the establishing of objective knowledge of 
the law. 'Some Realism about Realism'， pp. 55-6. 
43. For Bentham on the principle of utility， see: An lntroduction to 
the Principles of Moralsαnd Legislation， Chapter 1. 
44. Thus Summers writes of what he calls ‘pragmatic instrumental-
ism' as a general theory of law that was indigenous to the 
United States. For Summers's characterization of pragmatic in骨
strumentalism as a theory of law， and his assessment of its in-
fluence on American legal thought during the twentieth cen・
tury， see: lnstrumentαlismαndAmericαn Legαl Theoη" General 九
Introduction， General Conclu日ion.
45. Regarding Pound and the tenets of the sociological form of juris-
prudence he expounded， see: 'The Scope and Purposes of Socio岨
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of Social Interests'， HIαruαrdLαw Revie叫 57(1943)， 1-39. 
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Mor，αlity of Lαw (1964)， 2nd edition (New Haven， Connecticut: 
Yale University Press， 1969); Anαtomy of the Lαw (New York: 
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